GitHub Workflows security hardening
diff --git a/.github/workflows/build.yml b/.github/workflows/build.yml
index ffe5ea193c9..8825bdf389f 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/build.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 name: build
 on: [pull_request, push]
 
+permissions:
+  contents: read # to fetch code (actions/checkout)
+
 jobs:
   build:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
diff --git a/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml b/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml
index b62f595ebb0..26cf2350d36 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/pre-commit.yml
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ on:
   pull_request:
   push:
     branches: [master]
+permissions:
+  contents: read # to fetch code (actions/checkout)
 jobs:
   pre-commit:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest

This PR adds explicit [permissions section](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions) to workflows. This is a security best practice because by default workflows run with [extended set of permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#permissions-for-the-github_token) (except from `on: pull_request` [from external forks](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)). By specifying any permission explicitly all others are set to none. By using the principle of least privilege the damage a compromised workflow can do (because of an [injection](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/) or compromised third party tool or action) is restricted.
It is recommended to have [most strict permissions on the top level](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions) and grant write permissions on [job level](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs) case by case.