Daily Papers

Training generalist agents capable of adapting to diverse scenarios requires interactive environments for self-exploration. However, interactive environments remain critically scarce, and existing synthesis methods suffer from significant limitations regarding environmental diversity and scalability. To address these challenges, we introduce ScaleEnv, a framework that constructs fully interactive environments and verifiable tasks entirely from scratch. Specifically, ScaleEnv ensures environment reliability through procedural testing, and guarantees task completeness and solvability via tool dependency graph expansion and executable action verification. By enabling agents to learn through exploration within ScaleEnv, we demonstrate significant performance improvements on unseen, multi-turn tool-use benchmarks such as τ^2-Bench and VitaBench, highlighting strong generalization capabilities. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between increasing number of domains and model generalization performance, providing empirical evidence that scaling environmental diversity is critical for robust agent learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise as robotic planners but often struggle with long-horizon and complex tasks, especially in specialized environments requiring external knowledge. While hierarchical planning and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) address some of these challenges, they remain insufficient on their own and a deeper integration is required for achieving more reliable systems. To this end, we propose a neuro-symbolic approach that enhances LLMs-based planners with Knowledge Graph-based RAG for hierarchical plan generation. This method decomposes complex tasks into manageable subtasks, further expanded into executable atomic action sequences. To ensure formal correctness and proper decomposition, we integrate a Symbolic Validator, which also functions as a failure detector by aligning expected and observed world states. Our evaluation against baseline methods demonstrates the consistent significant advantages of integrating hierarchical planning, symbolic verification, and RAG across tasks of varying complexity and different LLMs. Additionally, our experimental setup and novel metrics not only validate our approach for complex planning but also serve as a tool for assessing LLMs' reasoning and compositional capabilities.

Autonomous agents powered by foundation models have seen widespread adoption across various real-world applications. However, they remain highly vulnerable to malicious instructions and attacks, which can result in severe consequences such as privacy breaches and financial losses. More critically, existing guardrails for LLMs are not applicable due to the complex and dynamic nature of agents. To tackle these challenges, we propose ShieldAgent, the first guardrail agent designed to enforce explicit safety policy compliance for the action trajectory of other protected agents through logical reasoning. Specifically, ShieldAgent first constructs a safety policy model by extracting verifiable rules from policy documents and structuring them into a set of action-based probabilistic rule circuits. Given the action trajectory of the protected agent, ShieldAgent retrieves relevant rule circuits and generates a shielding plan, leveraging its comprehensive tool library and executable code for formal verification. In addition, given the lack of guardrail benchmarks for agents, we introduce ShieldAgent-Bench, a dataset with 3K safety-related pairs of agent instructions and action trajectories, collected via SOTA attacks across 6 web environments and 7 risk categories. Experiments show that ShieldAgent achieves SOTA on ShieldAgent-Bench and three existing benchmarks, outperforming prior methods by 11.3% on average with a high recall of 90.1%. Additionally, ShieldAgent reduces API queries by 64.7% and inference time by 58.2%, demonstrating its high precision and efficiency in safeguarding agents.

Geometric Problem Solving (GPS) poses a unique challenge for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), requiring not only the joint interpretation of text and diagrams but also iterative visuospatial reasoning. While existing approaches process diagrams as static images, they lack the capacity for dynamic manipulation - a core aspect of human geometric reasoning involving auxiliary line construction and affine transformations. We present GeoSketch, a neural-symbolic framework that recasts geometric reasoning as an interactive perception-reasoning-action loop. GeoSketch integrates: (1) a Perception module that abstracts diagrams into structured logic forms, (2) a Symbolic Reasoning module that applies geometric theorems to decide the next deductive step, and (3) a Sketch Action module that executes operations such as drawing auxiliary lines or applying transformations, thereby updating the diagram in a closed loop. To train this agent, we develop a two-stage pipeline: supervised fine-tuning on 2,000 symbolic-curated trajectories followed by reinforcement learning with dense, symbolic rewards to enhance robustness and strategic exploration. To evaluate this paradigm, we introduce the GeoSketch Benchmark, a high-quality set of 390 geometry problems requiring auxiliary construction or affine transformations. Experiments on strong MLLM baselines demonstrate that GeoSketch significantly improves stepwise reasoning accuracy and problem-solving success over static perception methods. By unifying hierarchical decision-making, executable visual actions, and symbolic verification, GeoSketch advances multimodal reasoning from static interpretation to dynamic, verifiable interaction, establishing a new foundation for solving complex visuospatial problems.

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

The performance of autonomous Web GUI agents heavily relies on the quality and quantity of their training data. However, a fundamental bottleneck persists: collecting interaction trajectories from real-world websites is expensive and difficult to verify. The underlying state transitions are hidden, leading to reliance on inconsistent and costly external verifiers to evaluate step-level correctness. To address this, we propose AutoWebWorld, a novel framework for synthesizing controllable and verifiable web environments by modeling them as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and use coding agents to translate FSMs into interactive websites. Unlike real websites, where state transitions are implicit, AutoWebWorld explicitly defines all states, actions, and transition rules. This enables programmatic verification: action correctness is checked against predefined rules, and task success is confirmed by reaching a goal state in the FSM graph. AutoWebWorld enables a fully automated search-and-verify pipeline, generating over 11,663 verified trajectories from 29 diverse web environments at only $0.04 per trajectory. Training on this synthetic data significantly boosts real-world performance. Our 7B Web GUI agent outperforms all baselines within 15 steps on WebVoyager. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling law: as the synthetic data volume increases, performance on WebVoyager and Online-Mind2Web consistently improves.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

End-to-end GUI agents for real desktop environments require large amounts of high-quality interaction data, yet collecting human demonstrations is expensive and existing synthetic pipelines often suffer from limited task diversity or noisy, goal-drifting trajectories. We present a trajectory expansion framework Anchor that bootstraps scalable desktop supervision from a small set of verified seed demonstrations. Starting from each seed, we identify branch points that correspond to meaningful state changes and propose new, state-grounded task variants conditioned on the current GUI context. An executing agent then follows the proposed instructions to generate new trajectories, while a verifier enforces task completion via state-aware checks and trajectory-level consistency. To improve supervision quality, we further apply task-conditioned step-level filtering to remove ungrounded actions and denoise post-branch segments to maintain coherent intent. Experiments on standard desktop benchmarks, OSWorld and WindowsAgentArena, show that models fine-tuned on our expanded corpus achieve consistent improvements over zero-shot agents and representative synthesis baselines, and generalize across applications and operating systems.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) holds great promise for the development of autonomous agents under complex GUI tasks, but its scalability remains severely hampered by the verification of task completion. Existing task verification is treated as a passive, post-hoc process: a verifier (i.e., rule-based scoring script, reward or critic model, and LLM-as-a-Judge) analyzes the agent's entire interaction trajectory to determine if the agent succeeds. Such processing of verbose context that contains irrelevant, noisy history poses challenges to the verification protocols and therefore leads to prohibitive cost and low reliability. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose SmartSnap, a paradigm shift from this passive, post-hoc verification to proactive, in-situ self-verification by the agent itself. We introduce the Self-Verifying Agent, a new type of agent designed with dual missions: to not only complete a task but also to prove its accomplishment with curated snapshot evidences. Guided by our proposed 3C Principles (Completeness, Conciseness, and Creativity), the agent leverages its accessibility to the online environment to perform self-verification on a minimal, decisive set of snapshots. Such evidences are provided as the sole materials for a general LLM-as-a-Judge verifier to determine their validity and relevance. Experiments on mobile tasks across model families and scales demonstrate that our SmartSnap paradigm allows training LLM-driven agents in a scalable manner, bringing performance gains up to 26.08% and 16.66% respectively to 8B and 30B models. The synergizing between solution finding and evidence seeking facilitates the cultivation of efficient, self-verifying agents with competitive performance against DeepSeek V3.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Autonomous GUI agents face two fundamental challenges: early stopping, where agents prematurely declare success without verifiable evidence, and repetitive loops, where agents cycle through the same failing actions without recovery. We present VLAA-GUI, a modular GUI agentic framework built around three integrated components that guide the system on when to Stop, Recover, and Search. First, a mandatory Completeness Verifier enforces UI-observable success criteria and verification at every finish step -- with an agent-level verifier that cross-examines completion claims with decision rules, rejecting those lacking direct visual evidence. Second, a mandatory Loop Breaker provides multi-tier filtering: switching interaction mode after repeated failures, forcing strategy changes after persistent screen-state recurrence, and binding reflection signals to strategy shifts. Third, an on-demand Search Agent searches online for unfamiliar workflows by directly querying a capable LLM with search ability, returning results as plain text. We additionally integrate a Coding Agent for code-intensive actions and a Grounding Agent for precise action grounding, both invoked on demand when required. We evaluate VLAA-GUI across five top-tier backbones, including Opus 4.5, 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, on two benchmarks with Linux and Windows tasks, achieving top performance on both (77.5% on OSWorld and 61.0% on WindowsAgentArena). Notably, three of the five backbones surpass human performance (72.4%) on OSWorld in a single pass. Ablation studies show that all three proposed components consistently improve a strong backbone, while a weaker backbone benefits more from these tools when the step budget is sufficient. Further analysis also shows that the Loop Breaker nearly halves wasted steps for loop-prone models.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

Tool-calling agents are increasingly deployed in real-world customer-facing workflows. Yet most studies on tool-calling agents focus on idealized settings with general, fixed, and well-specified tasks. In real-world applications, user requests are often (1) ambiguous, (2) changing over time, or (3) infeasible due to policy constraints, and training and evaluation data that cover these diverse, complex interaction patterns remain under-represented. To bridge the gap, we present Trajectory2Task, a verifiable data generation pipeline for studying tool use at scale under three realistic user scenarios: ambiguous intent, changing intent, and infeasible intents. The pipeline first conducts multi-turn exploration to produce valid tool-call trajectories. It then converts these trajectories into user-facing tasks with controlled intent adaptations. This process yields verifiable task that support closed-loop evaluation and training. We benchmark seven state-of-the-art LLMs on the generated complex user scenario tasks and observe frequent failures. Finally, using successful trajectories obtained from task rollouts, we fine-tune lightweight LLMs and find consistent improvements across all three conditions, along with better generalization to unseen tool-use domains, indicating stronger general tool-calling ability.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, capable of performing a broad range of actions, such as invoking tools and controlling robots, show great potential in tackling real-world challenges. LLM agents are typically prompted to produce actions by generating JSON or text in a pre-defined format, which is usually limited by constrained action space (e.g., the scope of pre-defined tools) and restricted flexibility (e.g., inability to compose multiple tools). This work proposes to use executable Python code to consolidate LLM agents' actions into a unified action space (CodeAct). Integrated with a Python interpreter, CodeAct can execute code actions and dynamically revise prior actions or emit new actions upon new observations through multi-turn interactions. Our extensive analysis of 17 LLMs on API-Bank and a newly curated benchmark shows that CodeAct outperforms widely used alternatives (up to 20% higher success rate). The encouraging performance of CodeAct motivates us to build an open-source LLM agent that interacts with environments by executing interpretable code and collaborates with users using natural language. To this end, we collect an instruction-tuning dataset CodeActInstruct that consists of 7k multi-turn interactions using CodeAct. We show that it can be used with existing data to improve models in agent-oriented tasks without compromising their general capability. CodeActAgent, finetuned from Llama2 and Mistral, is integrated with Python interpreter and uniquely tailored to perform sophisticated tasks (e.g., model training) using existing libraries and autonomously self-debug.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

Multimodal agents for computer use rely exclusively on primitive actions (click, type, scroll) that require accurate visual grounding and lengthy execution chains, leading to cascading failures and performance bottlenecks. While other agents leverage rich programmatic interfaces (APIs, MCP servers, tools), computer-use agents (CUAs) remain isolated from these capabilities. We present UltraCUA, a foundation model that bridges this gap through hybrid action -- seamlessly integrating GUI primitives with high-level programmatic tool calls. To achieve this, our approach comprises four key components: (1) an automated pipeline that scales programmatic tools from software documentation, open-source repositories, and code generation; (2) a synthetic data engine producing over 17,000 verifiable tasks spanning real-world computer-use scenarios; (3) a large-scale high-quality hybrid action trajectory collection with both low-level GUI actions and high-level programmatic tool calls; and (4) a two-stage training pipeline combining supervised fine-tuning with online reinforcement learning, enabling strategic alternation between low-level and high-level actions. Experiments with our 7B and 32B models demonstrate substantial improvements over state-of-the-art agents. On OSWorld, UltraCUA models achieve an average 22% relative improvement over base models, while being 11% faster in terms of steps. Out-of-domain evaluation on WindowsAgentArena shows our model reaches 21.7% success rate, outperforming baselines trained on Windows data. The hybrid action mechanism proves critical, reducing error propagation while maintaining execution efficiency.

Reward-guided search methods have demonstrated strong potential in enhancing tool-using agents by effectively guiding sampling and exploration over complex action spaces. As a core design, those search methods utilize process reward models (PRMs) to provide step-level rewards, enabling more fine-grained monitoring. However, there is a lack of systematic and reliable evaluation benchmarks for PRMs in tool-using settings. In this paper, we introduce ToolPRMBench, a large-scale benchmark specifically designed to evaluate PRMs for tool-using agents. ToolPRMBench is built on top of several representative tool-using benchmarks and converts agent trajectories into step-level test cases. Each case contains the interaction history, a correct action, a plausible but incorrect alternative, and relevant tool metadata. We respectively utilize offline sampling to isolate local single-step errors and online sampling to capture realistic multi-step failures from full agent rollouts. A multi-LLM verification pipeline is proposed to reduce label noise and ensure data quality. We conduct extensive experiments across large language models, general PRMs, and tool-specialized PRMs on ToolPRMBench. The results reveal clear differences in PRM effectiveness and highlight the potential of specialized PRMs for tool-using. Code and data will be released at https://github.com/David-Li0406/ToolPRMBench.

The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous work has shown that current LLM-based agents execute numerous malicious tasks even without being attacked, indicating a deficiency in agentic use safety alignment during the post-training phase. To address this gap, we propose AgentAlign, a novel framework that leverages abstract behavior chains as a medium for safety alignment data synthesis. By instantiating these behavior chains in simulated environments with diverse tool instances, our framework enables the generation of highly authentic and executable instructions while capturing complex multi-step dynamics. The framework further ensures model utility by proportionally synthesizing benign instructions through non-malicious interpretations of behavior chains, precisely calibrating the boundary between helpfulness and harmlessness. Evaluation results on AgentHarm demonstrate that fine-tuning three families of open-source models using our method substantially improves their safety (35.8% to 79.5% improvement) while minimally impacting or even positively enhancing their helpfulness, outperforming various prompting methods. The dataset and code have both been open-sourced.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

Recent advancements in software engineering agents have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating program improvements. However, their reliance on closed-source or resource-intensive models introduces significant deployment challenges in private environments, prompting a critical question: How can personally deployable open-source LLMs achieve comparable code reasoning performance? To this end, we propose a unified Test-Time Compute scaling framework that leverages increased inference-time computation instead of larger models. Our framework incorporates two complementary strategies: internal TTC and external TTC. Internally, we introduce a development-contextualized trajectory synthesis method leveraging real-world software repositories to bootstrap multi-stage reasoning processes, such as fault localization and patch generation. We further enhance trajectory quality through rejection sampling, rigorously evaluating trajectories along accuracy and complexity. Externally, we propose a novel development-process-based search strategy guided by reward models and execution verification. This approach enables targeted computational allocation at critical development decision points, overcoming limitations of existing "end-point only" verification methods. Evaluations on SWE-bench Verified demonstrate our 32B model achieves a 46\% issue resolution rate, surpassing significantly larger models such as DeepSeek R1 671B and OpenAI o1. Additionally, we provide the empirical validation of the test-time scaling phenomenon within SWE agents, revealing that models dynamically allocate more tokens to increasingly challenging problems, effectively enhancing reasoning capabilities. We publicly release all training data, models, and code to facilitate future research. https://github.com/yingweima2022/SWE-Reasoner

Computer-Use Agents (CUA) are becoming increasingly capable of autonomously operating digital environments through Graphical User Interfaces (GUI). Yet, most GUI remain designed primarily for humans--prioritizing aesthetics and usability--forcing agents to adopt human-oriented behaviors that are unnecessary for efficient task execution. At the same time, rapid advances in coding-oriented language models (Coder) have transformed automatic GUI design. This raises a fundamental question: Can CUA as judges to assist Coder for automatic GUI design? To investigate, we introduce AUI-Gym, a benchmark for Automatic GUI development spanning 52 applications across diverse domains. Using language models, we synthesize 1560 tasks that simulate real-world scenarios. To ensure task reliability, we further develop a verifier that programmatically checks whether each task is executable within its environment. Building on this, we propose a Coder-CUA in Collaboration framework: the Coder acts as Designer, generating and revising websites, while the CUA serves as Judge, evaluating functionality and refining designs. Success is measured not by visual appearance, but by task solvability and CUA navigation success rate. To turn CUA feedback into usable guidance, we design a CUA Dashboard that compresses multi-step navigation histories into concise visual summaries, offering interpretable guidance for iterative redesign. By positioning agents as both designers and judges, our framework shifts interface design toward agent-native efficiency and reliability. Our work takes a step toward shifting agents from passive use toward active participation in digital environments. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/showlab/AUI.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Code Executing Reasoning is becoming a new non-functional metric that assesses the ability of large language models (LLMs) in programming tasks. State-of-the-art frameworks (CodeMind or REval) and benchmarks (CruxEval) usually focus on LLM's prediction of a given code's input/output or intermediate variable states/values on limited programs. However, there is no tool for more in-depth analysis of the results. Without such a tool, the observations about LLM's code execution reasoning cannot be generalized to more datasets, preventing the research community and practitioners from devising the next generation of LLMs with better code execution reasoning abilities. This paper introduces ExeRScope, a series of tools and heuristics to analyze the result of code execution reasoning frameworks to understand better the impact of code properties in the studied benchmarks on the code execution reasoning. With such tooling, analysis can be generalized to code with similar properties without the urgent need to design more benchmarks, which is a cumbersome effort.

Formal verification can provably guarantee the correctness of critical system software, but the high proof burden has long hindered its wide adoption. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown success in code analysis and synthesis. In this paper, we present a combination of LLMs and static analysis to synthesize invariants, assertions, and other proof structures for a Rust-based formal verification framework called Verus. In a few-shot setting, LLMs demonstrate impressive logical ability in generating postconditions and loop invariants, especially when analyzing short code snippets. However, LLMs lack the ability to retain and propagate context information, a strength of traditional static analysis. Based on these observations, we developed a prototype based on OpenAI's GPT-4 model. Our prototype decomposes the verification task into multiple smaller ones, iteratively queries GPT-4, and combines its output with lightweight static analysis. We evaluated the prototype with a developer in the automation loop on 20 vector-manipulating programs. The results demonstrate that it significantly reduces human effort in writing entry-level proof code.

Verification is critical for improving agents: it provides the reward signal for Reinforcement Learning and enables inference-time gains through Test-Time Scaling (TTS). Despite its importance, verification in software engineering (SWE) agent settings often relies on code execution, which can be difficult to scale due to environment setup overhead. Scalable alternatives such as patch classifiers and heuristic methods exist, but they are less grounded in codebase context and harder to interpret. To this end, we explore Agentic Rubrics: an expert agent interacts with the repository to create a context-grounded rubric checklist, and candidate patches are then scored against it without requiring test execution. On SWE-Bench Verified under parallel TTS evaluation, Agentic Rubrics achieve a score of 54.2% on Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B and 40.6% on Qwen3-32B, with at least a +3.5 percentage-point gain over the strongest baseline in our comparison set. We further analyze rubric behavior, showing that rubric scores are consistent with ground-truth tests while also flagging issues that tests do not capture. Our ablations show that agentic context gathering is essential for producing codebase-specific, unambiguous criteria. Together, these results suggest that Agentic Rubrics provide an efficient, scalable, and granular verification signal for SWE agents.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities but often produce unreliable or incorrect responses. Existing verification methods are typically model-specific or domain-restricted, requiring significant computational resources and lacking scalability across diverse reasoning tasks. To address these limitations, we propose VerifiAgent, a unified verification agent that integrates two levels of verification: meta-verification, which assesses completeness and consistency in model responses, and tool-based adaptive verification, where VerifiAgent autonomously selects appropriate verification tools based on the reasoning type, including mathematical, logical, or commonsense reasoning. This adaptive approach ensures both efficiency and robustness across different verification scenarios. Experimental results show that VerifiAgent outperforms baseline verification methods (e.g., deductive verifier, backward verifier) among all reasoning tasks. Additionally, it can further enhance reasoning accuracy by leveraging feedback from verification results. VerifiAgent can also be effectively applied to inference scaling, achieving better results with fewer generated samples and costs compared to existing process reward models in the mathematical reasoning domain. Code is available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/VerifiAgent

Agentic AI systems act through tools and evolve their behavior over long, stochastic interaction traces. This setting complicates assurance, because behavior depends on nondeterministic environments and probabilistic model outputs. Prior work introduced runtime verification for agentic AI via Dynamic Probabilistic Assurance (DPA), learning an MDP online and model checking quantitative properties. A key limitation is that developers must manually define the state abstraction, which couples verification to application-specific heuristics and increases adoption friction. This paper proposes TriCEGAR, a trace-driven abstraction mechanism that automates state construction from execution logs and supports online construction of an agent behavioral MDP. TriCEGAR represents abstractions as predicate trees learned from traces and refined using counterexamples. We describe a framework-native implementation that (i) captures typed agent lifecycle events, (ii) builds abstractions from traces, (iii) constructs an MDP, and (iv) performs probabilistic model checking to compute bounds such as Pmax(success) and Pmin(failure). We also show how run likelihoods enable anomaly detection as a guardrailing signal.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Recent advances in large language models have improved the capabilities of coding agents, yet systematic evaluation of complex, end-to-end website development remains limited. To address this gap, we introduce Vision2Web, a hierarchical benchmark for visual website development, spanning from static UI-to-code generation, interactive multi-page frontend reproduction, to long-horizon full-stack website development. The benchmark is constructed from real-world websites and comprises a total of 193 tasks across 16 categories, with 918 prototype images and 1,255 test cases. To support flexible, thorough and reliable evaluation, we propose workflow-based agent verification paradigm based on two complementary components: a GUI agent verifier and a VLM-based judge. We evaluate multiple visual language models instantiated under different coding-agent frameworks, revealing substantial performance gaps at all task levels, with state-of-the-art models still struggling on full-stack development.

Code verifiers play a critical role in post-verification for LLM-based code generation, yet existing supervised fine-tuning methods suffer from data scarcity, high failure rates, and poor inference efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising alternative by optimizing models through execution-driven rewards without labeled supervision, our preliminary results show that naive RL with only functionality rewards fails to generate effective unit tests for difficult branches and samples. We first theoretically analyze showing that branch coverage, sample difficulty, syntactic and functional correctness can be jointly modeled as RL rewards, where optimizing these signals can improve the reliability of unit-test-based verification. Guided by this analysis, we design syntax- and functionality-aware rewards and further propose branch- and sample-difficulty--aware RL using exponential reward shaping and static analysis metrics. With this formulation, CVeDRL achieves state-of-the-art performance with only 0.6B parameters, yielding up to 28.97% higher pass rate and 15.08% higher branch coverage than GPT-3.5, while delivering over 20times faster inference than competitive baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/LIGHTCHASER1/CVeDRL.git

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

A promising research direction in enabling LLMs to generate consistently correct code involves addressing their inability to properly estimate program execution, particularly for code they generate. In this work, we demonstrate that Code LLMs can be trained to simulate program execution in a step-by-step manner and that this capability can be leveraged to improve competitive programming performance. Our approach combines supervised fine-tuning on natural language execution traces, textual explanations grounded in true execution, with reinforcement learning using verifiable rewards. We introduce two complementary objectives: output prediction given code and inputs, and solving competitive programming tasks with either ground-truth or self-predicted execution feedback. These objectives enable models to perform self-verification over multiple candidate solutions, and iterative self-fixing by simulating test execution. Across multiple competitive programming benchmarks, our method yields consistent improvements over standard reasoning approaches. We further present ablations and analysis to elucidate the role of execution simulation and its limitations.

Large language models (LLMs) can translate natural language into optimization code, but silent failures pose a critical risk: code that executes and returns solver-feasible solutions may encode semantically incorrect formulations, creating a feasibility-correctness gap of up to 90 percentage points on compositional problems. We introduce ReLoop, addressing silent failures from two complementary directions. Structured generation decomposes code production into a four-stage reasoning chain (understand, formalize, synthesize, verify) that mirrors expert modeling practice, with explicit variable-type reasoning and self-verification to prevent formulation errors at their source. Behavioral verification detects errors that survive generation by testing whether the formulation responds correctly to solver-based parameter perturbation, without requiring ground truth -- an external semantic signal that bypasses the self-consistency problem inherent in LLM-based code review. The two mechanisms are complementary: structured generation dominates on complex compositional problems, while behavioral verification becomes the largest single contributor on problems with localized formulation defects. Together with execution recovery via IIS-enhanced diagnostics, ReLoop raises correctness from 22.6% to 31.1% and execution from 72.1% to 100.0% on the strongest model, with consistent gains across five models spanning three paradigms (foundation, SFT, RL) and three benchmarks. We additionally release RetailOpt-190, 190 compositional retail optimization scenarios targeting the multi-constraint interactions where LLMs most frequently fail.

Developing AI agents to autonomously manipulate graphical user interfaces is a long challenging task. Recent advances in data scaling law inspire us to train computer-use agents with a scaled instruction set, yet using behavior cloning to train agents still requires immense high-quality trajectories. To meet the scalability need, we designed STEVE, a step verification pipeline for computer-use agent training. First, we establish a large instruction set for computer-use agents and collect trajectory data with some suboptimal agents. GPT-4o is used to verify the correctness of each step in the trajectories based on the screens before and after the action execution, assigning each step with a binary label. Last, we adopt the Kahneman and Tversky Optimization to optimize the agent from the binary stepwise labels. Extensive experiments manifest that our agent outperforms supervised finetuning by leveraging both positive and negative actions within a trajectory. Also, STEVE enables us to train a 7B vision-language model as a computer-use agent, achieving leading performance in the challenging live desktop environment WinAgentArena with great efficiency at a reduced cost. Code and data: https://github.com/FanbinLu/STEVE.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a key technique for enhancing large language models (LLMs), with verification engineering playing a central role. However, best practices for RL in instruction following remain underexplored. In this work, we explore the verification challenge in RL for instruction following and propose VerIF, a verification method that combines rule-based code verification with LLM-based verification from a large reasoning model (e.g., QwQ-32B). To support this approach, we construct a high-quality instruction-following dataset, VerInstruct, containing approximately 22,000 instances with associated verification signals. We apply RL training with VerIF to two models, achieving significant improvements across several representative instruction-following benchmarks. The trained models reach state-of-the-art performance among models of comparable size and generalize well to unseen constraints. We further observe that their general capabilities remain unaffected, suggesting that RL with VerIF can be integrated into existing RL recipes to enhance overall model performance. We have released our datasets, codes, and models to facilitate future research at https://github.com/THU-KEG/VerIF.

Current paradigms for code verification rely heavily on external mechanisms-such as execution-based unit tests or auxiliary LLM judges-which are often labor-intensive or limited by the judging model's own capabilities. This raises a fundamental, yet unexplored question: Can an LLM's functional correctness be assessed purely from its internal computational structure? Our primary objective is to investigate whether the model's neural dynamics encode internally decodable signals that are predictive of logical validity during code generation. Inspired by mechanistic interpretability, we propose to treat code verification as a mechanistic diagnostic task, mapping the model's explicit algorithmic trajectory into line-level attribution graphs. By decomposing complex residual flows, we aim to identify the structural signatures that distinguish sound reasoning from logical failure within the model's internal circuits. Analysis across Python, C++, and Java confirms that intrinsic correctness signals are robust across diverse syntaxes. Topological features from these internal graphs predict correctness more reliably than surface heuristics and enable targeted causal interventions to fix erroneous logic. These findings establish internal introspection as a decodable property for verifying generated code. Our code is at https:// github.com/bruno686/CodeCircuit.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) are central to human-computer interaction, yet automating complex GUI tasks remains a major challenge for autonomous agents, largely due to a lack of scalable, high-quality training data. While recordings of human demonstrations offer a rich data source, they are typically long, unstructured, and lack annotations, making them difficult for agents to learn from.To address this, we introduce ShowUI-Aloha, a comprehensive pipeline that transforms unstructured, in-the-wild human screen recordings from desktop environments into structured, actionable tasks. Our framework includes four key components: A recorder that captures screen video along with precise user interactions like mouse clicks, keystrokes, and scrolls. A learner that semantically interprets these raw interactions and the surrounding visual context, translating them into descriptive natural language captions. A planner that reads the parsed demonstrations, maintains task states, and dynamically formulates the next high-level action plan based on contextual reasoning. An executor that faithfully carries out these action plans at the OS level, performing precise clicks, drags, text inputs, and window operations with safety checks and real-time feedback. Together, these components provide a scalable solution for collecting and parsing real-world human data, demonstrating a viable path toward building general-purpose GUI agents that can learn effectively from simply observing humans.

We propose SWE-Universe, a scalable and efficient framework for automatically constructing real-world software engineering (SWE) verifiable environments from GitHub pull requests (PRs). To overcome the prevalent challenges of automatic building, such as low production yield, weak verifiers, and prohibitive cost, our framework utilizes a building agent powered by an efficient custom-trained model. This agent employs iterative self-verification and in-loop hacking detection to ensure the reliable generation of high-fidelity, verifiable tasks. Using this method, we scale the number of real-world multilingual SWE environments to a million scale (807,693). We demonstrate the profound value of our environments through large-scale agentic mid-training and reinforcement learning. Finally, we applied this technique to Qwen3-Max-Thinking and achieved a score of 75.3% on SWE-Bench Verified. Our work provides both a critical resource and a robust methodology to advance the next generation of coding agents.

Large Action Models (LAMs) extend large language models by enabling autonomous decision-making and tool execution, making them promising for automating scientific workflows. However, scientific workflows impose strict requirements on reproducibility, auditability, and deterministic execution, which are not satisfied by generic LLM-based agents. Unconstrained action generation can lead to silent state changes, non-deterministic executions, and irreproducible experimental results, limiting the applicability of LAMs in scientific settings. In this paper, we propose R-LAM, a reproducibility-constrained framework for applying Large Action Models to scientific workflow automation. R-LAM introduces structured action schemas, deterministic execution policies, and explicit provenance tracking to ensure that every action and intermediate artifact is auditable and replayable. The framework supports failure-aware execution loops and controlled workflow forking, enabling iterative experimentation without compromising reproducibility. We implement R-LAM as a lightweight Python framework and release it as an open-source PyPI package to facilitate reproducible research. An experimental evaluation of representative scientific workflows demonstrates that R-LAM improves reproducibility success rates and execution reliability compared to unconstrained LLM-based agents, while retaining adaptive control over workflow execution.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Code auditing is the process of reviewing code with the aim of identifying bugs. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities for this task without requiring compilation, while also supporting user-friendly customization. However, auditing a code repository with LLMs poses significant challenges: limited context windows and hallucinations can degrade the quality of bug reports, and analyzing large-scale repositories incurs substantial time and token costs, hindering efficiency and scalability. This work introduces an LLM-based agent, RepoAudit, designed to perform autonomous repository-level code auditing. Equipped with agent memory, RepoAudit explores the codebase on demand by analyzing data-flow facts along feasible program paths within individual functions. It further incorporates a validator module to mitigate hallucinations by verifying data-flow facts and checking the satisfiability of path conditions associated with potential bugs, thereby reducing false positives. RepoAudit detects 40 true bugs across 15 real-world benchmark projects with a precision of 78.43%, requiring on average only 0.44 hours and $2.54 per project. Also, it detects 185 new bugs in high-profile projects, among which 174 have been confirmed or fixed. We have open-sourced RepoAudit at https://github.com/PurCL/RepoAudit.

Agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in the software industry, contributing code as collaborators or even autonomous developers. As their presence grows, it becomes important to assess the current boundaries of their coding abilities. Existing agentic coding benchmarks, however, cover a limited task scope, e.g., bug fixing within a single pull request (PR), and often rely on non-executable evaluations or lack an automated approach for continually updating the evaluation coverage. To address such issues, we propose FeatureBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate agentic coding performance in end-to-end, feature-oriented software development. FeatureBench incorporates an execution-based evaluation protocol and a scalable test-driven method that automatically derives tasks from code repositories with minimal human effort. By tracing from unit tests along a dependency graph, our approach can identify feature-level coding tasks spanning multiple commits and PRs scattered across the development timeline, while ensuring the proper functioning of other features after the separation. Using this framework, we curated 200 challenging evaluation tasks and 3825 executable environments from 24 open-source repositories in the first version of our benchmark. Empirical evaluation reveals that the state-of-the-art agentic model, such as Claude 4.5 Opus, which achieves a 74.4% resolved rate on SWE-bench, succeeds on only 11.0% of tasks, opening new opportunities for advancing agentic coding. Moreover, benefiting from our automated task collection toolkit, FeatureBench can be easily scaled and updated over time to mitigate data leakage. The inherent verifiability of constructed environments also makes our method potentially valuable for agent training.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest great promises in code and proof generations. However, scaling automated formal verification to real-world projects requires resolving cross-module dependencies and global contexts, which are crucial challenges overlooked by existing LLM-based methods with a special focus on targeting isolated, function-level verification tasks. To systematically explore and address the significant challenges of verifying entire software repositories, we introduce RVBench, the first verification benchmark explicitly designed for repository-level evaluation, constructed from four diverse and complex open-source Verus projects. We further introduce RagVerus, an extensible framework that synergizes retrieval-augmented generation with context-aware prompting to automate proof synthesis for multi-module repositories. RagVerus triples proof pass rates on existing benchmarks under constrained model inference budgets, and achieves a 27% relative improvement on the more challenging RVBench benchmark, demonstrating a scalable and sample-efficient verification solution.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

We present ExCyTIn-Bench, the first benchmark to Evaluate an LLM agent x on the task of Cyber Threat Investigation through security questions derived from investigation graphs. Real-world security analysts must sift through a large number of heterogeneous alert signals and security logs, follow multi-hop chains of evidence, and compile an incident report. With the developments of LLMs, building LLM-based agents for automatic thread investigation is a promising direction. To assist the development and evaluation of LLM agents, we construct a dataset from a controlled Azure tenant that covers 8 simulated real-world multi-step attacks, 57 log tables from Microsoft Sentinel and related services, and 589 automatically generated questions. We leverage security logs extracted with expert-crafted detection logic to build threat investigation graphs, and then generate questions with LLMs using paired nodes on the graph, taking the start node as background context and the end node as answer. Anchoring each question to these explicit nodes and edges not only provides automatic, explainable ground truth answers but also makes the pipeline reusable and readily extensible to new logs. This also enables the automatic generation of procedural tasks with verifiable rewards, which can be naturally extended to training agents via reinforcement learning. Our comprehensive experiments with different models confirm the difficulty of the task: with the base setting, the average reward across all evaluated models is 0.249, and the best achieved is 0.368, leaving substantial headroom for future research. Code and data are coming soon!

Verification is crucial for effective mathematical reasoning. We present a new temporal consistency method where verifiers iteratively refine their judgments based on the previous assessment. Unlike one-round verification or multi-model debate approaches, our method leverages consistency in a sequence of self-reflection actions to improve verification accuracy. Empirical evaluations across diverse mathematical process error identification benchmarks (Mathcheck, ProcessBench, and PRM800K) show consistent performance improvements over baseline methods. When applied to the recent DeepSeek R1 distilled models, our method demonstrates strong performance, enabling 7B/8B distilled models to outperform all 70B/72B models and GPT-4o on ProcessBench. Notably, the distilled 14B model with our method achieves performance comparable to Deepseek-R1. Our codes are available at https://github.com/jcguo123/Temporal-Consistency

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) improves instruction following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from training inefficiency due to inadequate difficulty assessment. Moreover, RLVR is prone to over-optimization, where LLMs exploit verification shortcuts without aligning to the actual intent of user instructions. We introduce Instruction Following Decorator (IFDecorator}, a framework that wraps RLVR training into a robust and sample-efficient pipeline. It consists of three components: (1) a cooperative-adversarial data flywheel that co-evolves instructions and hybrid verifications, generating progressively more challenging instruction-verification pairs; (2) IntentCheck, a bypass module enforcing intent alignment; and (3) trip wires, a diagnostic mechanism that detects reward hacking via trap instructions, which trigger and capture shortcut exploitation behaviors. Our Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct-IFDecorator achieves 87.43% accuracy on IFEval, outperforming larger proprietary models such as GPT-4o. Additionally, we demonstrate substantial improvements on FollowBench while preserving general capabilities. Our trip wires show significant reductions in reward hacking rates. We will release models, code, and data for future research.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

One of the principal challenges in building VLM-powered GUI agents is visual grounding, i.e., localizing the appropriate screen region for action execution based on both the visual content and the textual plans. Most existing work formulates this as a text-based coordinate generation task. However, these approaches suffer from several limitations: weak spatial-semantic alignment, inability to handle ambiguous supervision targets, and a mismatch between the dense nature of screen coordinates and the coarse, patch-level granularity of visual features extracted by models like Vision Transformers. In this paper, we propose GUI-Actor, a VLM-based method for coordinate-free GUI grounding. At its core, GUI-Actor introduces an attention-based action head that learns to align a dedicated <ACTOR> token with all relevant visual patch tokens, enabling the model to propose one or more action regions in a single forward pass. In line with this, we further design a grounding verifier to evaluate and select the most plausible action region from the candidates proposed for action execution. Extensive experiments show that GUI-Actor outperforms prior state-of-the-art methods on multiple GUI action grounding benchmarks, with improved generalization to unseen screen resolutions and layouts. Notably, GUI-Actor-7B even surpasses UI-TARS-72B (38.1) on ScreenSpot-Pro, achieving scores of 40.7 with Qwen2-VL and 44.6 with Qwen2.5-VL as backbones. Furthermore, by incorporating the verifier, we find that fine-tuning only the newly introduced action head (~100M parameters for 7B model) while keeping the VLM backbone frozen is sufficient to achieve performance comparable to previous state-of-the-art models, highlighting that GUI-Actor can endow the underlying VLM with effective grounding capabilities without compromising its general-purpose strengths.

Loop invariants are fundamental to reasoning about programs with loops. They establish properties about a given loop's behavior. When they additionally are inductive, they become useful for the task of formal verification that seeks to establish strong mathematical guarantees about program's runtime behavior. The inductiveness ensures that the invariants can be checked locally without consulting the entire program, thus are indispensable artifacts in a formal proof of correctness. Finding inductive loop invariants is an undecidable problem, and despite a long history of research towards practical solutions, it remains far from a solved problem. This paper investigates the capabilities of the Large Language Models (LLMs) in offering a new solution towards this old, yet important problem. To that end, we first curate a dataset of verification problems on programs with loops. Next, we design a prompt for exploiting LLMs, obtaining inductive loop invariants, that are checked for correctness using sound symbolic tools. Finally, we explore the effectiveness of using an efficient combination of a symbolic tool and an LLM on our dataset and compare it against a purely symbolic baseline. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can help improve the state-of-the-art in automated program verification.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

We consider the task of mapping pseudocode to long programs that are functionally correct. Given test cases as a mechanism to validate programs, we search over the space of possible translations of the pseudocode to find a program that passes the validation. However, without proper credit assignment to localize the sources of program failures, it is difficult to guide search toward more promising programs. We propose to perform credit assignment based on signals from compilation errors, which constitute 88.7% of program failures. Concretely, we treat the translation of each pseudocode line as a discrete portion of the program, and whenever a synthesized program fails to compile, an error localization method tries to identify the portion of the program responsible for the failure. We then focus search over alternative translations of the pseudocode for those portions. For evaluation, we collected the SPoC dataset (Search-based Pseudocode to Code) containing 18,356 programs with human-authored pseudocode and test cases. Under a budget of 100 program compilations, performing search improves the synthesis success rate over using the top-one translation of the pseudocode from 25.6% to 44.7%.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Agent skills, structured procedural knowledge packages injected at inference time, are increasingly used to augment LLM agents on software engineering tasks. However, their real utility in end-to-end development settings remains unclear. We present SWE-Skills-Bench, the first requirement-driven benchmark that isolates the marginal utility of agent skills in real-world software engineering (SWE). It pairs 49 public SWE skills with authentic GitHub repositories pinned at fixed commits and requirement documents with explicit acceptance criteria, yielding approximately 565 task instances across six SWE subdomains. We introduce a deterministic verification framework that maps each task's acceptance criteria to execution-based tests, enabling controlled paired evaluation with and without the skill. Our results show that skill injection benefits are far more limited than rapid adoption suggests: 39 of 49 skills yield zero pass-rate improvement, and the average gain is only +1.2%. Token overhead varies from modest savings to a 451% increase while pass rates remain unchanged. Only seven specialized skills produce meaningful gains (up to +30%), while three degrade performance (up to -10%) due to version-mismatched guidance conflicting with project context. These findings suggest that agent skills are a narrow intervention whose utility depends strongly on domain fit, abstraction level, and contextual compatibility. SWE-Skills-Bench provides a testbed for evaluating the design, selection, and deployment of skills in software engineering agents. SWE-Skills-Bench is available at https://github.com/GeniusHTX/SWE-Skills-Bench.

The demonstrated code-understanding capability of LLMs raises the question of whether they can be used for automated program verification, a task that often demands high-level abstract reasoning about program properties, which is challenging for verification tools. We propose a general methodology to combine the power of LLMs and automated reasoners for automated program verification. We formally describe this methodology as a set of derivation rules and prove its soundness. We instantiate the calculus as a sound automated verification procedure, which led to practical improvements on a set of synthetic and competition benchmarks.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

Predicting program behavior without execution is an essential and challenging task in software engineering. Traditional models often struggle to capture dynamic dependencies and interactions within code. This paper introduces a novel machine learning-based framework called CodeFlowrepresents, which predicts code coverage and detects runtime errors through Dynamic Dependencies Learning. Utilizing control flow graphs (CFGs), CodeFlowrepresents all possible execution paths and the relationships between different statements, offering a comprehensive understanding of program behavior. It constructs CFGs to depict execution paths and learns vector representations for CFG nodes, capturing static control-flow dependencies. Additionally, it learns dynamic dependencies through execution traces, which reflect the impacts among statements during execution. This approach enables accurate prediction of code coverage and identification of runtime errors. Empirical evaluations show significant improvements in code coverage prediction accuracy and effective localization of runtime errors, surpassing current models.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate plausible code but offer limited guarantees of correctness. Formally verifying that implementations satisfy specifications requires constructing machine-checkable proofs, a task that remains beyond current automation. We propose a hierarchical proof search framework for automated code verification in Lean~4 that decomposes complex verification goals into structurally simpler subgoals before attempting tactic-level proving. Central to our approach is a principled decomposition score that combines constructive justification with structural effectiveness. Crucially, this score serves as both the training reward and the inference-time ranking criterion, ensuring strict alignment between optimization and deployment. We train Goedel-Code-Prover-8B, a single unified policy for both decomposition and completion, via supervised initialization followed by hybrid reinforcement learning, where a continuous decomposition reward drives planning exploration while supervised replay stabilizes proof generation. On three Lean-based code verification benchmarks comprising 427 tasks, our 8B-parameter model achieves a 62.0\% prove success rate, a 2.6times improvement over the strongest baseline, surpassing neural provers up to 84times larger. We further observe consistent inference-time scaling: success rates improve monotonically with search iterations and sampling budget, with our trained model achieving greater efficiency than frontier off-the-shelf models of comparable scale.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

Computer-using agents powered by Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated human-like capabilities in operating digital environments like mobile platforms. While these agents hold great promise for advancing digital automation, their potential for unsafe operations, such as system compromise and privacy leakage, is raising significant concerns. Detecting these safety concerns across the vast and complex operational space of mobile environments presents a formidable challenge that remains critically underexplored. To establish a foundation for mobile agent safety research, we introduce MobileRisk-Live, a dynamic sandbox environment accompanied by a safety detection benchmark comprising realistic trajectories with fine-grained annotations. Built upon this, we propose OS-Sentinel, a novel hybrid safety detection framework that synergistically combines a Formal Verifier for detecting explicit system-level violations with a VLM-based Contextual Judge for assessing contextual risks and agent actions. Experiments show that OS-Sentinel achieves 10%-30% improvements over existing approaches across multiple metrics. Further analysis provides critical insights that foster the development of safer and more reliable autonomous mobile agents.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

Improving open-source models on real-world SWE tasks (solving GITHUB issues) faces two key challenges: 1) scalable curation of execution environments to train these models, and, 2) optimal scaling of test-time compute. We introduce AgentGym, the largest procedurally-curated executable gym environment for training real-world SWE-agents, consisting of more than 8.7K tasks. AgentGym is powered by two main contributions: 1) SYNGEN: a synthetic data curation recipe that enables scalable curation of executable environments using test-generation and back-translation directly from commits, thereby reducing reliance on human-written issues or unit tests. We show that this enables more scalable training leading to pass@1 performance of 34.4% on SWE-Bench Verified benchmark with our 32B model. 2) Hybrid Test-time Scaling: we provide an in-depth analysis of two test-time scaling axes; execution-based and execution-free verifiers, demonstrating that they exhibit complementary strengths and limitations. Test-based verifiers suffer from low distinguishability, while execution-free verifiers are biased and often rely on stylistic features. Surprisingly, we find that while each approach individually saturates around 42-43%, significantly higher gains can be obtained by leveraging their complementary strengths. Overall, our approach achieves 51% on the SWE-Bench Verified benchmark, reflecting a new state-of-the-art for open-weight SWE-agents and for the first time showing competitive performance with proprietary models such as o1, o1-preview and sonnet-3.5-v2 (with tools). We will open-source our environments, models, and agent trajectories.

The effectiveness of an AI model in accurately classifying novel malware hinges on the quality of the features it is trained on, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of the analysis tool used. Peekaboo, a Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tool, defeats malware evasion techniques to capture authentic behavior at the Assembly (ASM) instruction level. This behavior exhibits patterns consistent with Zipf's law, a distribution commonly seen in natural languages, making Transformer models particularly effective for binary classification tasks. We introduce Alpha, a framework for zero day malware detection that leverages Transformer models and ASM language. Alpha is trained on malware and benign software data collected through Peekaboo, enabling it to identify entirely new samples with exceptional accuracy. Alpha eliminates any common functions from the test samples that are in the training dataset. This forces the model to rely on contextual patterns and novel ASM instruction combinations to detect malicious behavior, rather than memorizing familiar features. By combining the strengths of DBI, ASM analysis, and Transformer architectures, Alpha offers a powerful approach to proactively addressing the evolving threat of malware. Alpha demonstrates perfect accuracy for Ransomware, Worms and APTs with flawless classification for both malicious and benign samples. The results highlight the model's exceptional performance in detecting truly new malware samples.

Control Flow Attestation (CFA) allows remote verification of run-time software integrity in embedded systems. However, CFA is limited by the storage/transmission costs of generated control flow logs (CFlog). Recent work has proposed application-specific optimizations by speculating on likely sub-paths in CFlog and replacing them with reserved symbols at runtime. Albeit effective, prior approaches do not consider the representation of addresses in a control flow path for speculation. This work proposes RESPEC-CFA, an architectural extension for CFA allowing for speculation on (1) the locality of control flows and (2) their Huffman encoding. Alone, RESPEC-CFA reduces CFlog sizes by up to 90.1%. Combined with prior methods, RESPEC-CFA yields reductions of up to 99.7%, representing a significant step toward practical CFA.

Code agents are advancing rapidly, but debugging them is becoming increasingly difficult. As frameworks orchestrate parallel tool calls and multi-stage workflows over complex tasks, making the agent's state transitions and error propagation hard to observe. In these runs, an early misstep can trap the agent in unproductive loops or even cascade into fundamental errors, forming hidden error chains that make it hard to tell when the agent goes off track and why. Existing agent tracing analyses either focus on simple interaction or rely on small-scale manual inspection, which limits their scalability and usefulness for real coding workflows. We present CodeTracer, a tracing architecture that parses heterogeneous run artifacts through evolving extractors, reconstructs the full state transition history as a hierarchical trace tree with persistent memory, and performs failure onset localization to pinpoint the failure origin and its downstream chain. To enable systematic evaluation, we construct CodeTraceBench from a large collection of executed trajectories generated by four widely used code agent frameworks on diverse code tasks (e.g., bug fixing, refactoring, and terminal interaction), with supervision at both the stage and step levels for failure localization. Experiments show that CodeTracer substantially outperforms direct prompting and lightweight baselines, and that replaying its diagnostic signals consistently recovers originally failed runs under matched budgets. Our code and data are publicly available.

MCP standardizes how LLMs interact with external systems, forming the foundation for general agents. However, existing MCP benchmarks remain narrow in scope: they focus on read-heavy tasks or tasks with limited interaction depth, and fail to capture the complexity and realism of real-world workflows. To address this gap, we propose MCPMark, a benchmark designed to evaluate MCP use in a more realistic and comprehensive manner. It consists of 127 high-quality tasks collaboratively created by domain experts and AI agents. Each task begins with a curated initial state and includes a programmatic script for automatic verification. These tasks demand richer and more diverse interactions with the environment, involving a broad range of create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) operations. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of cutting-edge LLMs using a minimal agent framework that operates in a tool-calling loop. Empirical results show that the best-performing model, gpt-5-medium, reaches only 52.56\% pass@1 and 33.86\% pass^4, while other widely regarded strong models, including claude-sonnet-4 and o3, fall below 30\% pass@1 and 15\% pass^4. On average, LLMs require 16.2 execution turns and 17.4 tool calls per task, significantly surpassing those in previous MCP benchmarks and highlighting the stress-testing nature of MCPMark.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is pivotal for the continuous evolution of GUI agents, yet existing evaluation paradigms face significant limitations. Rule-based methods suffer from poor scalability and cannot handle open-ended tasks, while LLM-as-a-Judge approaches rely on passive visual observation, often failing to capture latent system states due to partial state observability. To address these challenges, we advocate for a paradigm shift from passive evaluation to Agentic Interactive Verification. We introduce VAGEN, a framework that employs a verifier agent equipped with interaction tools to autonomously plan verification strategies and proactively probe the environment for evidence of task completion. Leveraging the insight that GUI tasks are typically "easy to verify but hard to solve", VAGEN overcomes the bottlenecks of visual limitations. Experimental results on OSWorld-Verified and AndroidWorld benchmarks demonstrate that VAGEN significantly improves evaluation accuracy compared to LLM-as-a-Judge baselines and further enhances performance through test-time scaling strategies.

Training computer-use agents requires massive amounts of GUI interaction data, but manually annotating action trajectories at scale is prohibitively expensive. We present VideoAgentTrek, a scalable pipeline that automatically mines training data from publicly available screen-recorded videos at web scale, eliminating the need for manual annotation. Our approach addresses a key challenge: raw videos contain implicit demonstrations but lack explicit action labels. To solve this, we develop Video2Action, an inverse dynamics module (IDM) with two components: (1) a video grounding model that detects and localizes GUI actions with precise temporal boundaries and context, and (2) an action-content recognizer that extracts structured parameters like click coordinates and typed text with high fidelity. Applied to 39,000 YouTube tutorial videos, our pipeline generates 1.52 million interaction steps automatically. We leverage this data through continued pretraining followed by supervised fine-tuning. On OSWorld-Verified, our approach improves task success rates from 9.3% (SFT-only baseline) to 15.8%, a 70% relative improvement. On AgentNetBench, step accuracy increases from 64.1% to 69.3%. Our results demonstrate that passive internet videos can be transformed into high-quality supervision for computer-use agents, providing a scalable alternative to expensive manual annotation.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku and Opus. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

Execution-aware LLM agents offer a promising paradigm for learning from tool feedback, but such feedback is often expensive and slow to obtain, making online reinforcement learning (RL) impractical. High-coverage hardware verification exemplifies this challenge due to its reliance on industrial simulators and non-differentiable execution signals. We propose LLM4Cov, an offline agent-learning framework that models verification as memoryless state transitions guided by deterministic evaluators. Building on this formulation, we introduce execution-validated data curation, policy-aware agentic data synthesis, and worst-state-prioritized sampling to enable scalable learning under execution constraints. We further curate a reality-aligned benchmark adapted from an existing verification suite through a revised evaluation protocol. Using the proposed pipeline, a compact 4B-parameter model achieves 69.2% coverage pass rate under agentic evaluation, outperforming its teacher by 5.3% and demonstrating competitive performance against models an order of magnitude larger.

Automated code generation with large language models has gained significant traction, but there remains no guarantee on the correctness of generated code. We aim to use formal verification to provide mathematical guarantees that the generated code is correct. However, generating formally verified code with LLMs is hindered by the scarcity of training data and the complexity of formal proofs. To tackle this challenge, we introduce AlphaVerus, a self-improving framework that bootstraps formally verified code generation by iteratively translating programs from a higher-resource language and leveraging feedback from a verifier. AlphaVerus operates in three phases: exploration of candidate translations, Treefinement -- a novel tree search algorithm for program refinement using verifier feedback, and filtering misaligned specifications and programs to prevent reward hacking. Through this iterative process, AlphaVerus enables a LLaMA-3.1-70B model to generate verified code without human intervention or model finetuning. AlphaVerus shows an ability to generate formally verified solutions for HumanEval and MBPP, laying the groundwork for truly trustworthy code-generation agents.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Solving complex reasoning tasks is a key real-world application of agents. Thanks to the pretraining of Large Language Models (LLMs) on code data, recent approaches like CodeAct successfully use code as LLM agents' action, achieving good results. However, CodeAct greedily generates the next action's code block by relying on fragmented thoughts, resulting in inconsistency and instability. Moreover, CodeAct lacks action-related ground-truth (GT), making its supervision signals and termination conditions questionable in multi-turn interactions. To address these issues, we first introduce a simple yet effective end-to-end code generation paradigm, CodeProgram, which leverages code's systematic logic to align with global reasoning and enable cohesive problem-solving. Then, we propose Tree-of-Code (ToC), which self-grows CodeProgram nodes based on the executable nature of the code and enables self-supervision in a GT-free scenario. Experimental results on two datasets using ten popular zero-shot LLMs show ToC remarkably boosts accuracy by nearly 20% over CodeAct with less than 1/4 turns. Several LLMs even perform better on one-turn CodeProgram than on multi-turn CodeAct. To further investigate the trade-off between efficacy and efficiency, we test different ToC tree sizes and exploration mechanisms. We also highlight the potential of ToC's end-to-end data generation for supervised and reinforced fine-tuning.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have catalyzed vibe coding, where users leverage LLMs to generate and iteratively refine code through natural language interactions until it passes their vibe check. Vibe check is tied to real-world human preference and goes beyond functionality: the solution should feel right, read cleanly, preserve intent, and remain correct. However, current code evaluation remains anchored to pass@k and captures only functional correctness, overlooking the non-functional instructions that users routinely apply. In this paper, we hypothesize that instruction following is the missing piece underlying vibe check that represents human preference in coding besides functional correctness. To quantify models' code instruction following capabilities with measurable signals, we present VeriCode, a taxonomy of 30 verifiable code instructions together with corresponding deterministic verifiers. We use the taxonomy to augment established evaluation suites, resulting in Vibe Checker, a testbed to assess both code instruction following and functional correctness. Upon evaluating 31 leading LLMs, we show that even the strongest models struggle to comply with multiple instructions and exhibit clear functional regression. Most importantly, a composite score of functional correctness and instruction following correlates the best with human preference, with the latter emerging as the primary differentiator on real-world programming tasks. Our work identifies core factors of the vibe check, providing a concrete path for benchmarking and developing models that better align with user preferences in coding.

Autonomous user interface (UI) agents aim to facilitate task automation by interacting with the user interface without manual intervention. Recent studies have investigated eliciting the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) for effective engagement in diverse environments. To align with the input-output requirement of LLMs, existing approaches are developed under a sandbox setting where they rely on external tools and application-specific APIs to parse the environment into textual elements and interpret the predicted actions. Consequently, those approaches often grapple with inference inefficiency and error propagation risks. To mitigate the challenges, we introduce Auto-UI, a multimodal solution that directly interacts with the interface, bypassing the need for environment parsing or reliance on application-dependent APIs. Moreover, we propose a chain-of-action technique -- leveraging a series of intermediate previous action histories and future action plans -- to help the agent decide what action to execute. We evaluate our approach on a new device-control benchmark AITW with 30K unique instructions, spanning multi-step tasks such as application operation, web searching, and web shopping. Experimental results show that Auto-UI achieves state-of-the-art performance with an action type prediction accuracy of 90% and an overall action success rate of 74%. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/cooelf/Auto-UI.

Computer use agents are LLM-based agents that can directly interact with a graphical user interface, by processing screenshots or accessibility trees. While these systems are gaining popularity, their safety has been largely overlooked, despite the fact that evaluating and understanding their potential for harmful behavior is essential for widespread adoption. To address this gap, we introduce OS-Harm, a new benchmark for measuring safety of computer use agents. OS-Harm is built on top of the OSWorld environment and aims to test models across three categories of harm: deliberate user misuse, prompt injection attacks, and model misbehavior. To cover these cases, we create 150 tasks that span several types of safety violations (harassment, copyright infringement, disinformation, data exfiltration, etc.) and require the agent to interact with a variety of OS applications (email client, code editor, browser, etc.). Moreover, we propose an automated judge to evaluate both accuracy and safety of agents that achieves high agreement with human annotations (0.76 and 0.79 F1 score). We evaluate computer use agents based on a range of frontier models - such as o4-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Pro - and provide insights into their safety. In particular, all models tend to directly comply with many deliberate misuse queries, are relatively vulnerable to static prompt injections, and occasionally perform unsafe actions. The OS-Harm benchmark is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/os-harm.

Code verification has recently found great success as a critical component in training large scale reasoning models for coding. Synthetic techniques such as self-generated test cases and reward models provide a way to enhance code capabilities beyond predefined tests. Building on these advancements, we propose new benchmarks designed to systematically evaluate the impact of synthetic verification methods on assessing solution correctness. We introduce HE-R, HE-R+, MBPP-R, and MBPP-R+, which transform existing coding benchmarks into scoring and ranking datasets to evaluate the effectiveness of synthetic verifiers. Using these benchmarks, we analyze synthetic verification methods in standard, reasoning-based, and reward-based LLMs. Our results show that recent reasoning models significantly improve test case generation and that scaling test cases enhances verification accuracy.

Identifying vulnerability-fixing commits corresponding to disclosed CVEs is essential for secure software maintenance but remains challenging at scale, as large repositories contain millions of commits of which only a small fraction address security issues. Existing automated approaches, including traditional machine learning techniques and recent large language model (LLM)-based methods, often suffer from poor precision-recall trade-offs. Frequently evaluated on randomly sampled commits, we uncover that they are substantially underestimating real-world difficulty, where candidate commits are already security-relevant and highly similar. We propose Favia, a forensic, agent-based framework for vulnerability-fix identification that combines scalable candidate ranking with deep and iterative semantic reasoning. Favia first employs an efficient ranking stage to narrow the search space of commits. Each commit is then rigorously evaluated using a ReAct-based LLM agent. By providing the agent with a pre-commit repository as environment, along with specialized tools, the agent tries to localize vulnerable components, navigates the codebase, and establishes causal alignment between code changes and vulnerability root causes. This evidence-driven process enables robust identification of indirect, multi-file, and non-trivial fixes that elude single-pass or similarity-based methods. We evaluate Favia on CVEVC, a large-scale dataset we made that comprises over 8 million commits from 3,708 real-world repositories, and show that it consistently outperforms state-of-the-art traditional and LLM-based baselines under realistic candidate selection, achieving the strongest precision-recall trade-offs and highest F1-scores.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into tool-using agents, they remain brittle in long-horizon interactions. Unlike mathematical reasoning where errors are often rectifiable via backtracking, tool-use failures frequently induce irreversible side effects, making accurate step-level verification critical. However, existing process-level benchmarks are predominantly confined to closed-world mathematical domains, failing to capture the dynamic and open-ended nature of tool execution. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentProcessBench, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating step-level effectiveness in realistic, tool-augmented trajectories. The benchmark comprises 1,000 diverse trajectories and 8,509 human-labeled step annotations with 89.1% inter-annotator agreement. It features a ternary labeling scheme to capture exploration and an error propagation rule to reduce labeling ambiguity. Extensive experiments reveal key insights: (1) weaker policy models exhibit inflated ratios of correct steps due to early termination; (2) distinguishing neutral and erroneous actions remains a significant challenge for current models; and (3) process-derived signals provide complementary value to outcome supervision, significantly enhancing test-time scaling. We hope AgentProcessBench can foster future research in reward models and pave the way toward general agents. The code and data are available at https://github.com/RUCBM/AgentProcessBench.

LLM-based agents are deployed in safety-critical applications, yet current guardrail systems fail to prevent violations of temporal safety policies, requirements that govern the ordering and sequencing of agent actions. For instance, agents may access sensitive data before authenticating users or process refunds to unauthorized payment methods, violations that require reasoning about sequences of action rather than an individual action. Existing guardrails rely on imprecise natural language instructions or post-hoc monitoring, and provide no formal guarantees that agents will satisfy temporal constraints. We present Agent-C, a novel framework that provides run-time guarantees ensuring LLM agents adhere to formal temporal safety properties. Agent-C introduces a domain-specific language for expressing temporal properties (e.g., authenticate before accessing data), translates specifications to first-order logic, and uses SMT solving to detect non-compliant agent actions during token generation. When the LLM attempts to generate a non-compliant tool call, Agent-C leverages constrained generation techniques to ensure that every action generated by the LLM complies with the specification, and to generate a compliant alternative to a non-compliant agent action. We evaluate Agent-C across two real-world applications: retail customer service and airline ticket reservation system, and multiple language models (open and closed-source). Our results demonstrate that Agent-C achieves perfect safety (100% conformance, 0% harm), while improving task utility compared to state-of-the-art guardrails and unrestricted agents. On SoTA closed-source models, Agent-C improves conformance (77.4% to 100% for Claude Sonnet 4.5 and 83.7% to 100% for GPT-5), while simultaneously increasing utility (71.8% to 75.2% and 66.1% to 70.6%, respectively), representing a new SoTA frontier for reliable agentic reasoning.

We introduce GUI-360^circ, a large-scale, comprehensive dataset and benchmark suite designed to advance computer-using agents (CUAs). CUAs present unique challenges and is constrained by three persistent gaps: a scarcity of real-world CUA tasks, the lack of automated collection-and-annotation pipelines for multi-modal trajectories, and the absence of a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates GUI grounding, screen parsing, and action prediction. GUI-360^circ addresses these gaps with an LLM-augmented, largely automated pipeline for query sourcing, environment-template construction, task instantiation, batched execution, and LLM-driven quality filtering. The released corpus contains over 1.2M executed action steps across thousands of trajectories in popular Windows office applications, and includes full-resolution screenshots, accessibility metadata when available, instantiated goals, intermediate reasoning traces, and both successful and failed action trajectories. The dataset supports three canonical tasks, GUI grounding, screen parsing, and action prediction, and a hybrid GUI+API action space that reflects modern agent designs. Benchmarking state-of-the-art vision--language models on GUI-360^circ reveals substantial out-of-the-box shortcomings in grounding and action prediction; supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning yield significant gains but do not close the gap to human-level reliability. We release GUI-360^circ and accompanying code to facilitate reproducible research and accelerate progress on robust desktop CUAs. The full dataset has been made public on https://huggingface.co/datasets/vyokky/GUI-360.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve strong performance by generating long reasoning traces with reflection. Through a large-scale empirical analysis, we find that a substantial fraction of reflective steps consist of self-verification (recheck) that repeatedly confirm intermediate results. These rechecks occur frequently across models and benchmarks, yet the vast majority are confirmatory rather than corrective, rarely identifying errors and altering reasoning outcomes. This reveals a mismatch between how often self-verification is activated and how often it is actually useful. Motivated by this, we propose a novel, experience-driven test-time framework that reduces the overused verification. Our method detects the activation of recheck behavior, consults an offline experience pool of past verification outcomes, and estimates whether a recheck is likely unnecessary via efficient retrieval. When historical experience suggests unnecessary, a suppression signal redirects the model to proceed. Across multiple model and benchmarks, our approach reduces token usage up to 20.3% while maintaining the accuracy, and in some datasets even yields accuracy improvements.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

Large Language Models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in code generation, yet they often struggle with complex programming tasks that require deep algorithmic reasoning. While process supervision through learned reward models shows promise in guiding reasoning steps, it requires expensive training data and suffers from unreliable evaluation. We propose Outcome-Refining Process Supervision, a novel paradigm that treats outcome refinement itself as the process to be supervised. Our framework leverages concrete execution signals to ground the supervision of reasoning steps, while using tree-structured exploration to maintain multiple solution trajectories simultaneously. Experiments demonstrate that our approach enables even smaller models to achieve high success accuracy and performance metrics on competitive programming tasks, creates more reliable verification than traditional reward models without requiring training PRMs. Our approach achieves significant improvements across 5 models and 3 datasets: an average of 26.9% increase in correctness and 42.2% in efficiency. The results suggest that providing structured reasoning space with concrete verification signals is crucial for solving complex programming tasks. We open-source all our code and data at: https://github.com/zhuohaoyu/ORPS

Code agents can autonomously resolve GitHub issues, yet when they fail, current evaluation provides no visibility into where or why. Metrics such as Pass@1 collapse an entire execution into a single binary outcome, making it difficult to identify where and why the agent went wrong. To address this limitation, we introduce TRAJEVAL, a diagnostic framework that decomposes agent trajectories into three interpretable stages: search (file localization), read (function comprehension), and edit (modification targeting). For each stage, we compute precision and recall by comparing against reference patches. Analyzing 16,758 trajectories across three agent architectures and seven models, we find universal inefficiencies (all agents examine approximately 22x more functions than necessary) yet distinct failure modes: GPT-5 locates relevant code but targets edits incorrectly, while Qwen-32B fails at file discovery entirely. We validate that these diagnostics are predictive, achieving model-level Pass@1 prediction within 0.87-2.1% MAE, and actionable: real-time feedback based on trajectory signals improves two state-of-the-art models by 2.2-4.6 percentage points while reducing costs by 20-31%. These results demonstrate that our framework not only provides a more fine-grained analysis of agent behavior, but also translates diagnostic signals into tangible performance gains. More broadly, TRAJEVAL transforms agent evaluation beyond outcome-based benchmarking toward mechanism-driven diagnosis of agent success and failure.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege execution capabilities substantially expand the system attack surface. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security threat analysis of OpenClaw. To structure our analysis, we introduce a five-layer lifecycle-oriented security framework that captures key stages of agent operation, i.e., initialization, input, inference, decision, and execution, and systematically examine compound threats across the agent's operational lifecycle, including indirect prompt injection, skill supply chain contamination, memory poisoning, and intent drift. Through detailed case studies on OpenClaw, we demonstrate the prevalence and severity of these threats and analyze the limitations of existing defenses. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in current point-based defense mechanisms when addressing cross-temporal and multi-stage systemic risks, highlighting the need for holistic security architectures for autonomous LLM agents. Within this framework, we further examine representative defense strategies at each lifecycle stage, including plugin vetting frameworks, context-aware instruction filtering, memory integrity validation protocols, intent verification mechanisms, and capability enforcement architectures.

Action models are essential for enabling autonomous agents to perform complex tasks. However, training large action models remains challenging due to the diversity of agent environments and the complexity of agentic data. Despite growing interest, existing infrastructure provides limited support for scalable, agent-specific fine-tuning. We present ActionStudio, a lightweight and extensible data and training framework designed for large action models. ActionStudio unifies heterogeneous agent trajectories through a standardized format, supports diverse training paradigms including LoRA, full fine-tuning, and distributed setups, and integrates robust preprocessing and verification tools. We validate its effectiveness across both public and realistic industry benchmarks, demonstrating strong performance and practical scalability. We open-sourced code and data at https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/xLAM to facilitate research in the community.

Tool-augmented LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents that interleave natural-language reasoning with executable Python actions, as in CodeAct-style frameworks. In deployment, these agents rely on runtime state that persists across steps. By contrast, common training pipelines treat agent traces as token sequences, with execution semantics left implicit. This raises a data-centric question: Is state persistence merely an inference-time scaffold, or can models learn to exploit it when training data exposes the corresponding execution semantics? We isolate state persistence as a training-time variable. We introduce Opaque Knapsack, a procedurally generated family of partially observable optimization tasks designed to prevent one-shot solutions. Item attributes and constraints are hidden behind budgeted tool calls, forcing multi-turn control flow and iterative state revision. Holding task instances, prompts, tools, model, and supervision fixed, we generate paired trajectories differing only in whether interpreter state persists across steps or resets after each action. We then fine-tune identical base models (Qwen3-8B) on each trace variant and evaluate all four train-runtime combinations. Our 2x2 cross-evaluation shows that execution semantics primarily affect how agents reach solutions, not whether they do: solution quality is statistically indistinguishable across conditions, but token cost and stability differ substantially. A persistent-trained model in a stateless runtime triggers missing-variable errors in roughly 80% of episodes; a stateless-trained model in a persistent runtime redundantly re-derives retained state, using roughly 3.5x more tokens. Interpreter persistence should be treated as a first-class semantic of agent traces. Aligning fine-tuning data with deployment runtimes improves efficiency and reduces brittle train-runtime mismatches.

Clawdbot is a self-hosted, tool-using personal AI agent with a broad action space spanning local execution and web-mediated workflows, which raises heightened safety and security concerns under ambiguity and adversarial steering. We present a trajectory-centric evaluation of Clawdbot across six risk dimensions. Our test suite samples and lightly adapts scenarios from prior agent-safety benchmarks (including ATBench and LPS-Bench) and supplements them with hand-designed cases tailored to Clawdbot's tool surface. We log complete interaction trajectories (messages, actions, tool-call arguments/outputs) and assess safety using both an automated trajectory judge (AgentDoG-Qwen3-4B) and human review. Across 34 canonical cases, we find a non-uniform safety profile: performance is generally consistent on reliability-focused tasks, while most failures arise under underspecified intent, open-ended goals, or benign-seeming jailbreak prompts, where minor misinterpretations can escalate into higher-impact tool actions. We supplemented the overall results with representative case studies and summarized the commonalities of these cases, analyzing the security vulnerabilities and typical failure modes that Clawdbot is prone to trigger in practice.

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

Symbolic execution detects vulnerabilities with precision, but applying it to large codebases requires harnesses that set up symbolic state, model dependencies, and specify assertions. Writing these harnesses has traditionally been a manual process requiring expert knowledge, which significantly limits the scalability of the technique. We present Static Analysis Informed and LLM-Orchestrated Symbolic Execution (SAILOR), which automates symbolic execution harness construction by combining static analysis with LLM-based synthesis. SAILOR operates in three phases: (1) static analysis identifies candidate vulnerable locations and generates vulnerability specifications; (2) an LLM uses vulnerability specifications and orchestrates harness synthesis by iteratively refining drivers, stubs, and assertions against compiler and symbolic execution feedback; symbolic execution then detects vulnerabilities using the generated harness, and (3) concrete replay validates the symbolic execution results against the unmodified project source. This design combines the scalability of static analysis, the code reasoning of LLMs, the path precision of symbolic execution, and the ground truth produced by concrete execution. We evaluate SAILOR on 10 open-source C/C++ projects totaling 6.8 M lines of code. SAILOR discovers 379 distinct, previously unknown memory-safety vulnerabilities (421 confirmed crashes). The strongest of five baselines we compare SAILOR to (agentic vulnerability detection using Claude Code with full codebase access and unlimited interaction), finds only 12 vulnerabilities. Each phase of SAILOR is critical: Without static analysis targeting confirmed vulnerabilities drop 12.2X; without iterative LLM synthesis zero vulnerabilities are confirmed; and without symbolic execution no approach can detect more than 12 vulnerabilities.

Run the same LLM agent on the same task twice: do you get the same behavior? We find the answer is often no. In a study of 3,000 agent runs across three models (Llama 3.1 70B, GPT-4o, and Claude Sonnet 4.5) on HotpotQA, we observe that ReAct-style agents produce 2.0--4.2 distinct action sequences per 10 runs on average, even with identical inputs. More importantly, this variance predicts failure: tasks with consistent behavior (leq2 unique paths) achieve 80--92% accuracy, while highly inconsistent tasks (geq6 unique paths) achieve only 25--60%, a 32--55 percentage point gap depending on model. We trace variance to early decisions: 69% of divergence occurs at step 2, the first search query. Our results suggest that monitoring behavioral consistency during execution could enable early error detection and improve agent reliability.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Recent advancements in visual language models (VLMs) have notably enhanced their capabilities in handling complex Graphical User Interface (GUI) interaction tasks. Despite these improvements, current frameworks often struggle to generate correct actions in challenging GUI environments. State-of-the-art commercial VLMs are black-boxes, and fine-tuning open-source VLMs for GUI tasks requires significant resources. Additionally, existing trajectory-level evaluation and refinement techniques frequently fall short due to delayed feedback and local optimization issues. To address these challenges, we propose an approach that guides VLM agents with process supervision by a reward model during GUI navigation and control at inference time. This guidance allows the VLM agent to optimize actions at each inference step, thereby improving performance in both static and dynamic environments. In particular, our method demonstrates significant performance gains in three GUI navigation tasks, achieving a 3.4% improvement in single step action accuracy for static environments, along with a around 33% increase in task success rate in one dynamic environment. With further integration of trajectory reflection and retry mechanisms, we also demonstrate even greater enhancement in task success.

Existing agent safety benchmarks report binary accuracy, conflating early intervention with post-mortem analysis. A detector that flags a violation at step 8 enables intervention; one that reports it at step 48 provides only forensic value. This distinction is critical, yet current benchmarks cannot measure it. We introduce StepShield, the first benchmark to evaluate when violations are detected, not just whether. StepShield contains 9,213 code agent trajectories, including 1,278 meticulously annotated training pairs and a 7,935-trajectory test set with a realistic 8.1% rogue rate. Rogue behaviors are grounded in real-world security incidents across six categories. We propose three novel temporal metrics: Early Intervention Rate (EIR), Intervention Gap, and Tokens Saved. Surprisingly, our evaluation reveals that an LLM-based judge achieves 59% EIR while a static analyzer achieves only 26%, a 2.3x performance gap that is entirely invisible to standard accuracy metrics. We further show that early detection has direct economic benefits: our cascaded HybridGuard detector reduces monitoring costs by 75% and projects to $108M in cumulative savings over five years at enterprise scale. By shifting the focus of evaluation from whether to when, StepShield provides a new foundation for building safer and more economically viable AI agents. The code and data are released under an Apache 2.0 license.

While powerful, the inherent non-determinism of large language model (LLM) agents limits their application in structured operational environments where procedural fidelity and predictable execution are strict requirements. This limitation stems from current architectures that conflate probabilistic, high-level planning with low-level action execution within a single generative process. To address this, we introduce the Source Code Agent framework, a new paradigm built on the "Blueprint First, Model Second" philosophy. Our framework decouples the workflow logic from the generative model. An expert-defined operational procedure is first codified into a source code-based Execution Blueprint, which is then executed by a deterministic engine. The LLM is strategically invoked as a specialized tool to handle bounded, complex sub-tasks within the workflow, but never to decide the workflow's path. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on the challenging tau-bench benchmark, designed for complex user-tool-rule scenarios. Our results demonstrate that the Source Code Agent establishes a new state-of-the-art, outperforming the strongest baseline by 10.1 percentage points on the average Pass^1 score while dramatically improving execution efficiency. Our work enables the verifiable and reliable deployment of autonomous agents in applications governed by strict procedural logic.