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Aug 21

Adaptive Alarm Threshold Prediction in 4G Mobile Networks: A Percentile-Guided Deep Learning Framework with Interpretable Outputs

In mobile telecommunications, alarms act as early warning signals. They are triggered when a cell, the basic unit of radio coverage, shuts down or behaves abnormally. This signals a degradation in service quality, which directly affects the customer experience. To fix the issue, operators rely on preset thresholds to decide when an engineer should be sent out. In practice, these thresholds are set manually and remain fixed regardless of the time of day, traffic levels, or overall network conditions. This often leads to serious faults slipping through during busy hours, while minor issues can cause unnecessary callouts when the network is quiet. This paper presents a machine learning framework that automatically predicts four alarm thresholds, audit window duration, inactive time limit, total fluctuation count, and per hour fluctuation limit, from live network behavior. Since no ground truth labels exist for thresholds, we introduce a percentile guided label derivation strategy and evaluate four models on an anonymized dataset of 10,648 cells across three vendors and nine regions from a real 4G network, comprising a Gradient Boosted Trees baseline, a CNN-BiLSTM with attention, the proposed PCTN, and an iTransformer. PCTN performs the best overall with respect to three of the four targets, outperforming a state-of-the-art iTransformer while using 83 percent fewer parameters. Its mixed output heads and dynamic alpha mechanism produce thresholds that are both accurate and interpretable, allowing operators to inspect and adjust the learned policy without retraining. All comparisons are statistically significant at p < 0.001. The framework undergoes daily retraining using new data, which enables the thresholds to constantly adjust to changes in the network.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 3

AEGIS: A Backup Reflex for Physical AI

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 3

Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol (CHAP)

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 19

Safe, or Simply Incapable? Rethinking Safety Evaluation for Phone-Use Agents

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

  • 21 authors
·
May 7 2

ADAS-TO: A Large-Scale Multimodal Naturalistic Dataset and Empirical Characterization of Human Takeovers during ADAS Engagement

Takeovers remain a key safety vulnerability in production ADAS, yet existing public resources rarely provide takeover-centered, real-world data. We present ADAS-TO, the first large-scale naturalistic dataset dedicated to ADAS-to-manual transitions, containing 15,659 takeover-centered 20s clips from 327 drivers across 22 vehicle brands. Each clip synchronizes front-view video with CAN logs. Takeovers are defined as ADAS ON rightarrow OFF transitions, with the primary trigger labeled as brake, steer, gas, mixed, or system disengagement. We further separate planned driver-initiated terminations (Ego) from forced takeovers (Non-ego) using a rule-based partition. While most events occur within conservative kinematic margins, we identify a long tail of 285 safety-critical cases. For these events, we combine kinematic screening with vision--language (VLM) annotation to attribute hazards and relate them to intervention dynamics. The resulting cross-modal analysis shows distinct kinematic signatures across traffic dynamics, infrastructure degradation, and adverse environments, and finds that in 59.3% of critical cases, actionable visual cues emerge at least 3s before takeover, supporting the potential for semantics-aware early warning beyond late-stage kinematic triggers. The dataset is publicly released at huggingface.co/datasets/HenryYHW/ADAS-TO-Sample.

  • 4 authors
·
Mar 6